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Considering the Best Interests Test in the Context of Disabilities 
 




he United Kingdom is bound by several international obligations to eliminate discrimination 
against persons with disabilities, chief among these being the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’), which was ratified on 8 June 2009. 
Compliance with these obligations is secured at the domestic level through provisions such as those in 
the Equality Act 2010 (‘EA 2010’). However, parents with disabilities remain exceptionally vulnerable 
to losing the care and custody of their children under care orders and child arrangements orders. 
Thus, in 2006 the Social Care Institute for Excellence conducted a knowledge review which found 
that social workers and local authorities were, where these goals conflicted, less interested in keeping 
families with disabled members intact than in safeguarding children. These observations raise an 
important question: how should the law balance the best interests of children with the duty of the 
State to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities? 
This article seeks to answer the question on the basis that the obligations owed by the State to 
parents with disabilities are distinct from those owed by parents to their children. It is imperative to 
map out the legal relationships between the parties to ensure that an attempt to address the issue of 
discrimination on the part of the State against parents with disabilities will not lead to a mistaken 
weakening of the obligations owed by parents to their children. In other words, it will be argued that 
an objective standard should apply to disabled parents as it does to able-bodied parents, because no 
child should have to accept a standard of care below a minimum threshold simply because one or both 
of his or her parents are disabled. With this important caveat in mind, the article will provide a 
critique of the current approach by domestic courts to deliberating (a) care orders under section 31 of 
the Children Act 1989 (‘CA 1989’) and (b) child arrangements orders under section 8 of the CA 1989 
in the light of the welfare principle encapsulated in section 1 of the same Act. The domestic 
application of the welfare principle in relation to the parent-child relationship will be juxtaposed with 
the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in balancing the rights of 
the parent and child. It will be argued that the ECtHR’s approach is preferable to the welfare 
principle adopted in domestic courts because the former better captures conventional understanding 
of the parent-child relationship. On that footing, the article will recommend the replacement of the 
welfare principle with Choudhry and Fenwick’s ‘parallel analysis’,1 which is modelled on the ECtHR’s 
approach. As an alternative to the parallel analysis, the article will also demonstrate that Eekelaar’s 
‘modified least detrimental alternative’ analysis2 is preferable to the welfare principle. The adoption of 
either of these alternatives would have an incidental effect in helping the State better address its 
obligations to parents with disabilities but not at an unacceptable cost to the child’s welfare. 
																																								 																				
* Trinity College, Oxford 
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1 Shazia Choudhry and Helen Fenwick, ‘Taking the Rights of Parents and Children Seriously: Confronting the 
Welfare Principle under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 25(3) OJLS 453. 
2 John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the Welfare Principle’ [2002] CFLQ 237. 
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In the upshot, the article will argue that the most sensible approach to balancing the best 
interests of children with the State’s obligation to eliminate discrimination against parents with 
disabilities would be for the State to equalise the positions of disabled parents and their able-bodied 
counterparts under an objective test. Apart from jettisoning the welfare principle for either the 
‘parallel analysis’ or the ‘modified least detrimental alternative’ analysis, several other legal and non-
legal solutions will be proposed to address direct and indirect discrimination (such as subconscious 
bias) against parents with disabilities in the public law and private law proceedings on care orders and 
child arrangements orders respectively.  
1. The Duty to Eliminate Discrimination 
It is clear that the State has an obligation to eliminate discrimination against parents with disabilities, 
and that to separate a child from his or her parents on the basis of a disability of either or both of the 
parents, without more, would amount to discrimination. Article 23(4) of the CRPD specifically 
provides: 
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against 
their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best 
interests of the child. In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a 
disability of either the child or one or both of the parents. 
In addition, the State is bound by sweeping anti-discrimination provisions in several 
international instruments. For example, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) provides: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground… 
Another key source of obligations for the State is the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’), as incorporated into domestic law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’). The relevant article here is Article 8, which guarantees the right to 
respect for private and family life. Article 8 provides a substantive right for the parasitic Article 14 to 
latch on to, binding the State to ensure the prohibition of discrimination in cases where the right to 
respect for private and family life is engaged.  
Article 8: Right to respect for private and family life 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
Article 14: Prohibition of discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status. 
While Article 14 does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, Herring 
has suggested that there is good reason to think that the miscellaneous provision for discrimination 
based on ‘other status’ is wide enough to catch disability based on discrimination.3 Indeed, one would 
																																								 																				
3 Jonathan Herring, Family Law (7th edn, Pearson 2015) 545. 
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be hard-pressed to come up with principled reasons why discrimination based on disability would be 
permitted under the ECHR.  
At this juncture, it is necessary to identify two key differences between, on the one hand, the 
ECHR, and, on the other, the CRPD and ICCPR. First, unlike the CRPD and the ICCPR, the 
ECHR allows for a dialogic model between the English courts and the relevant international judicial 
institution – in this case, the ECtHR. This model enables us to compare the two lines of 
jurisprudence in relation to the parent-child relationship, as will be set out later in the article. For one, 
section 2 of the HRA 1998 provides that a court or tribunal ‘determining a question that has arisen in 
connection with a Convention right must take into account’ any relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
Further, the ECtHR has constantly reiterated the fact that national legislatures and courts are given a 
margin of appreciation as they ‘are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate 
the local needs and conditions and to decide on the nature and scope of the measures necessary to 
meet those needs’.4 Secondly, the ECHR differs from the CRPD and ICCPR in terms of legal status. 
The UK adopts a dualist legal framework so that international obligations acquire legal force only 
when they are given effect to in the form of statutory provisions. While the HRA 1998 expressly 
provides a mechanism for the provisions of the ECHR to be applied in the domestic legal system 
(through sections 2, 3, 4 and 6),5 there are no similar enforcement mechanisms for the CRPD and the 
ICCPR 
At the domestic level, section 15 of the EA 2010 addresses direct discrimination arising from 
disability and stipulates that:  
(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— 
(a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s 
disability, and 
(b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably 
have been expected to know, that B had the disability. 
Further, section 19 of the EA 2010 prevents indirect discrimination by prohibiting the 
application of a provision, criterion or practice that is disproportionately discriminatory in relation to a 
relevant protected characteristic, which includes an individual’s disability.6 
The cumulative effect of these international obligations and domestic legislation, as Lady Hale 
noted in Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria), is that ‘the State does not and 
cannot take away the children of all the people who (…) suffer from physical or mental illnesses or 
disabilities’.7 However, it is questionable whether all possible measures have been taken to ensure that 
parents with disabilities are not prejudiced against on the ground of their conditions. 
  
																																								 																				
4 Animal Defenders International v UK (2013) 57 EHRR 607. 
5 As mentioned above, section 2 of the Act obliges the UK courts to take into account judgments and decisions 
of the ECtHR when deciding a matter that involves a Convention right. Section 3 requires the courts to 
construe legislation so that it is compatible with the Convention rights where it is possible to do so. Section 4 
permits the courts to make a declaration that legislation is incompatible with the Convention rights. Section 6 
makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. A court 
is a public authority for these purposes. 
6	EA 2010, s 19(3).	
7 [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 1 WLR 1911 [143]. 
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2. Direct and Indirect Discrimination (Including Subconscious Bias) 
 
Theoretically, discrimination can be divided into direct and indirect discrimination. The EA 2010 
defines direct discrimination in section 13 as where a person treats someone less favourably than he 
would treat others because of a protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination is defined in section 
19, which prohibits practices that disproportionately put a disabled person at a disadvantage. To put it 
simply, direct discrimination occurs where one is discriminated against merely on the basis of certain 
characteristics, while indirect discrimination occurs where a uniform standard is applied, but one 
unreasonably fails to vary the standard to allow for certain characteristics.  
While the State is under an obligation to eliminate both direct and indirect discrimination, the 
two are treated quite differently. There is an absolute prohibition on direct discrimination, since there 
are arguably no grounds for treating people less favourably simply because they have certain protected 
characteristics. On the other hand, the law will not generally intervene where an objective, uniform 
standard is applied. In these cases, the discrimination may be justified as a proportionate means to a 
legitimate aim pursuant to section 19(2)(d) of the EA 2010. Where there is a legitimate difference in 
treatment warranted by certain characteristics, states tend to provide the bulk of assistance out of 
public funds and simultaneously require reasonable adjustments to be made to accommodate the 
relevant persons in their interactions with them.8  
In the context at hand, the prohibition on direct discrimination is manifested in the 
requirement that social workers assess each parent objectively on his or her capacity to care for their 
children and not decide the case merely on the basis of the parent(s)’ disability. It is unlikely that a 
social worker would consciously discriminate against parents simply because they were disabled. 
However, there may be subconscious bias on the part of social workers and local authorities where, 
due to an inadequate understanding of the abilities of persons with particular disabilities, they 
understate the competence of the parent and effectively discriminate against him or her. The article 
will propose solutions to address subconscious bias in due course. Further, the State has a duty to 
provide disabled parents with sufficient support so that their children receive at least the minimum 
standard of care. Its failure to discharge the duty would lead to unacceptable outcomes: (1) children 
whose parents have disabilities might have to accept a standard of care which falls below the 
minimum threshold; and (2) parents with disabilities would face indirect discrimination in relation to 
their right to care for their children. 
3. The Best Interests Test 
A. The Welfare Principle at English Law 
The State’s obligation to eliminate discrimination against parents with disabilities is distinct from the 
obligation to act in the best interests of children. The law as it stands safeguards the best interests of 
the child through the welfare principle set out in section 1 of the CA 1989, and the principle 
undergirds both the public law and private law proceedings discussed below. Subsection (1) provides: 
When a court determines any question with respect to— 
(a) the upbringing of a child; or 
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising 
from it, 
the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. 
																																								 																				
8 Arlene S Kanter, The Development of Disability Rights Under International Law: From Charity to Human 
Rights (2015 Routledge), 38. 
	 OXFORD UNIVERSITY	
UNDERGRADUATE LAW JOURNAL 
	 	 	
71 
While much has been said about the welfare principle,9 J v C10 remains the leading case on its 
meaning and application. In that case, Lord MacDermott, with whom Lord Pearson expressly agreed, 
explained that the phrase ‘paramount consideration’ in section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 
1925 means: 
more than that the child’s welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to 
the matter in question. [The words] connote a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, 
relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken 
into account and weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests 
of the child…11 
This suggests that the child’s welfare is ultimately the court’s sole consideration, with other 
secondary factors being taken into account in order to determine the course of action that would 
maximise the child’s welfare. That there is no room for considerations of parental rights per se was 
affirmed at the highest level in Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-Sex Partner)12 and Re B (A Child) 
(Residence: Biological Parent).13 In the former case, Baroness Hale, with the agreement of the rest of 
the Appellate Committee, reiterated that there ‘is no question of a parental right’14 and that the 
welfare of the child determines the course to be followed. In the latter case, Lord Kerr, delivering the 
leading opinion in the Supreme Court, emphasised that ‘In re G had given the final quietus to the 
notion that parental rights have any part to play in the assessment of where the best interests of a 
child lay’,15 and that ‘[i]t is only as a contributor to the child’s welfare that parenthood assumes any 
significance’.16 The uncompromising stance of the court in the application of the welfare principle 
means that parents with disabilities are expected to meet the best interests of the child to the same 
extent as their able-bodied counterparts. 
While the CA 1989 did not define ‘welfare’, it has added flesh to the concept through the 
statutory checklist in section 1(3). The checklist is mandatory when the court is considering whether, 
inter alia, to make a section 8 child arrangements order or a section 31 care order.17 For the purposes 
of this article, paragraph (f) of the subsection is especially significant because it takes into account the 
capability of each parent in meeting the child’s needs. As Herring has pointed out,18 the disability of a 
parent could have implications here. Thus, a disability could impede a parent from exercising his or 
her parental responsibilities, and render him or her particularly susceptible to losing the care or 
custody of the child. 
B. Applications of the Welfare Principle at English Law 
I. State-Parents Situations: Care Orders under CA 1989, s 31 
When a local authority or the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (‘NSPCC’) 
makes an application for a care order pursuant to section 31 of the CA 1989, it will often be placed in 
an antagonistic relationship with the parents of the child in question. Section 31(2) of the Act of 1989 
stipulates the ‘threshold criteria’ for making a care order: 
																																								 																				
9 See, for example, Helen Reece, ‘The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct?’ (1996) 49 Current 
Legal Problems 267. 
10 [1970] AC 668. 
11 J v C (n 10), 710-711. 
12 [2006] UKHL 43, [2006] 4 All ER 241. 
13 [2009] UKSC 5, [2009] 1 WLR 2496. 
14 Re G (n 12) [31]. 
15 Re B (n 13) [33]. 
16 ibid [37]. For a recent case following this line of authority, see Re E-R (a child) [2015] 2 FCR 385. 
17 CA 1989, s 1(4). 
18 Herring (n 3), 545. 
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A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied— 
(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and 
(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to— 
(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, 
not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or 
(ii) the child’s being beyond parental control. 
At this juncture, it is important to note that the threshold criteria constitute an objective 
standard which does not take into account the characteristics or capabilities of the parents, including 
whether or not one or both of them have disabilities. As Hughes LJ observed pointedly in Re D (A 
Child) (Care Order: Evidence):  
[If the requisite care] were to be judged by the standards of the parent with the characteristics 
of the particular parent in question, the protection afforded to children would be very limited 
indeed, if not entirely illusory. It would in effect then be limited to protection against the 
parent who was fully able to provide proper care but either chose not to do so or neglected 
through fault to do so.19  
The objective nature of the threshold criteria can be readily justified. For example, in X v 
Liverpool City Council, 20  a care order was obtained after a parent had repeatedly, and despite 
warnings, driven in a car with the children even though he was legally classified as blind. It is clear 
that the rationale of the decision was to protect the children in question rather than to effect 
impermissible social engineering.21 In the same vein, the court in Re D (A Child) (Care Order: 
Evidence) 22 observed that it is not discriminatory to assess a parent with learning disability by the 
standards demanded of an able-bodied parent.  
It may be asked whether the threshold criteria should be applied in light of the provision of 
available support to a parent.23 Hedley J’s speech in the different context of a parent’s care of a severely 
disabled child may be instructive here. He stated that ‘a parent cannot be said to be responsible for a 
falling below the standard of “reasonable care” if the public authorities cannot or do not provide what 
would be reasonably necessary to support that parent’.24 This could mean that the threshold criteria 
should be adjusted as against a parent with a disability who ought to have been provided with a 
reasonable level of support from public authorities. While this adjustment could potentially render 
disabled parents less susceptible to losing their child pursuant to a care order, it is also undesirable as 
it could open the floodgates to greater subjectivity in the threshold criteria at the expense of the child’s 
welfare. Other solutions would be proposed in the course of the article. 
II. Parent-Parent Situations: Child Arrangements Orders under CA 1989, s 8 
Section 8 child arrangements orders arise in private disputes concerning children. They are broadly 
classified into residence orders, contact orders, specific issue orders, prohibited steps orders, and 
orders varying or discharging such orders.25 In contrast to a section 31 care order, a section 8 child 
arrangements order may turn on the antagonistic relationship between a disabled parent and his or her 
																																								 																				
19 [2010] EWCA Civ 1000, [2011] 1 FLR 447 [35]. 
20 [2005] EWCA Civ 1173, [2006] 1 WLR 375. 
21 Re SB (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2009] UKSC 17, [2010] 1 AC 678 [17]. 
22 [2010] EWCA Civ 1000, [2011] 1 FLR 447. 
23 Stephen Gilmore and Lisa Glennon, Hayes and Williams’ Family Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 643. 
24 LBH (A Local Authority) v KJ [2007] EWHC 2798 (Fam) [22]. 
25 CA 1989, ss 8(1) and (2). 
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able-bodied counterpart. Local authorities drop out from the picture in these private law 
proceedings26 because it has been resolved that they can only seek to obtain parental responsibility for 
a child in care proceedings.  
As in care proceedings, the court must consider the checklist of factors in the CA 1989, s 
1(3).27 It seems that the manner in which the checklist is used differs from one judge to another,28 but 
it is abundantly clear that a decision would be liable to be overturned on appeal if a judge failed to 
consider an item on the checklist which was pertinent to the case.29 The disability of one parent is 
likely to be relevant under the CA 1989, s 1(3)(f), where the court considers how capable each parent 
is of meeting the child’s needs. In M v M (Parental Responsibility)30 a father suffered from learning 
disabilities, which were aggravated by a motorcycle accident, so that he had defective reasoning 
powers and a mercurial temper. Wilson J decided that, notwithstanding the father’s commitment to 
the child and the important relationship between them, it would be inappropriate to give the father 
parental responsibility because he was incapable of exercising the rights and responsibilities of 
parenthood. This and other similar cases demonstrate the need to explore ways to level the playing 
field between a disabled parent and a non-disabled one, so that the former’s disability does not 
unfairly render him or her at a disadvantage in seeking parental responsibility over the child. 
C. Problems with the Welfare Principle 
While the English courts have been adamant that there ‘is no question of a parental right’,31 that 
approach seems fundamentally at odds with the wording of the ECHR. Article 8 expressly provides 
that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life’. It is manifestly clear that an 
application to remove a child from his parent prima facie entails a serious threat to family life and 
potentially violates that parent’s Article 8 right. With respect, the UKSC cannot simply hold that 
there ‘is no question of a parental right’. While the domestic courts may be reluctant to whittle down 
the protection afforded to children, it seems untenable to argue that parental rights are irrelevant or, 
worse, non-existent in this context. Further, as Choudhry and Fenwick noted, the Convention 
requires a ‘careful and sensitive balancing act between competing rights and interests’ and not ‘a brief 
and mechanical recital’ that interference with parental rights is a ‘proportionate response’. 32  The 
‘failure to consider the Article 8(1) rights themselves prior to considering the consequentialist 
arguments under Article 8(2) amounts to a violation of the court’s duty under s 6(1), HRA’.33  
The current approach of the domestic courts also seems questionable when one considers the 
text of section 1(1) of the CA 1989, which provides that the welfare of the child shall be the 
‘paramount’ consideration. With respect, it is most unusual for the courts to interpret ‘paramount’ as 
‘sole’. While the word ‘sole’ suggests the irrelevance of considerations apart from the welfare of the 
child, ‘paramount’ may more naturally be taken to mean that relatively greater weight should be 
ascribed to the welfare of the child vis-à-vis other pertinent considerations. While both 
interpretations might result in the same outcome in the vast majority of cases, particularly if the 
weight given to the welfare of the child greatly exceeds the weight given to all other factors, there is a 
significant theoretical difference between the two. To illustrate the point, it is not the same to say 
that: (a) parental rights are almost always overridden by considerations as to the welfare of the child, 
and (b) there are no parental rights at all. Given the foregoing analysis of the wording in the ECHR 
and the CA 1989, it is submitted that parental rights ought to be taken into account in decisions 
																																								 																				
26 CA 1989, s 9(2). 
27 See n 17. 
28 Herring (n 3) 523. 
29 Re H (A Child) (Contact: Welfare Checklist) [2010] EWCA Civ 448, [2010] 2 FLR 866. 
30 [1999] 2 FLR 737. 
31 Re G (n 12) [31]. 
32 Choudhry and Fenwick (n 1) 465. 
33 ibid. 
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involving the parent-child relationship, such as care orders and child arrangements orders, as will be 
discussed below. 
Apart from arguments based on interpretation of the ECHR and the CA 1989, it seems 
contrary to conventional understanding to say that the welfare of the child is the sole consideration in 
circumstances turning on the parent-child relationship. Consider a case of a newborn infant with 
parents without disabilities, and suppose that, even after taking into account the blood relation with 
his natural parents, he would enjoy better welfare if he were brought up by a different set of parents. If 
the child’s welfare were the sole consideration, it would be justifiable to remove him from his natural 
parents so as to be brought up by the other set of parents. The fact that this example would be 
unpalatable to right-thinking individuals suggests that parents have rights not to have their children 
removed from them so long as they can provide a minimum standard of care for them. This seems to 
have been considered by Strasbourg jurisprudence, which does recognize parental rights, and it seems 
puzzling why the domestic courts have been reluctant to recognise this. With respect, it is submitted 
that it is imperative to take into account parental rights in arriving at decisions with a bearing on the 
parents-child relationship.  
D. The Best Interests Test under the ECHR 
In comparison to the approach of the English courts, the European Commission of Human Rights 
has adopted an approach that seems more in line with the text of the ECHR. In A and Byrne and 
Twenty-Twenty Television v UK34 the Commission squarely confronted the tension between the 
welfare principle and a parent’s Article 8 right to respect for her family life. The first applicant 
claimed that her Article 8 right was violated as a result of the refusal of the domestic courts, upon 
application of the welfare principle, to accept her decision that her child should participate in a 
television programme about her development and education in an institution catering for her special 
needs. The Commission held that the national authorities must strike a fair balance between the 
relevant competing interests. In other words, a child’s welfare is not the sole consideration and does 
not automatically prevail. This can be contrasted with the approach taken by the English courts.  
E. Reconciling the Two Lines of Jurisprudence  
Valiant attempts have been made by the English courts to reconcile the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
and the English courts. The key idea seems to be that this is merely an issue of semantics, and that in 
actual fact the tests applied really are the same. In Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) 
Lord Oliver observed that the conflict was only semantic and ‘lies only in differing ways of giving 
expression to the single common concept’.35 Further, in Re B (A Minor) Lord Nicholls opined that 
‘[a]lthough the phraseology is different, the criteria to be applied in deciding whether an adoption 
order is justified under Article 8(2) lead to the same result as the conventional tests applied by English 
law’.36 
While their Lordships may be correct insofar as the two tests tend to produce the same result in 
practice, it is equally clear that the two lines of jurisprudence differ considerably in terms of theoretical 
foundations. In particular, the Strasbourg line of reasoning furnishes a clearer theoretical framework, 
which is more helpful in practice. As Choudhry and Fenwick put it, the CA 1989 is ‘rule-utilitarian’ 
because the course of action taken is determined by the rule that the child’s welfare should be 
paramount.37 In contrast, the HRA 1998 exhibits ‘qualified deontology’ because it is rights-based 
although some of the rights, such as Article 8, are qualified by exceptions.38 This theoretical difference 
																																								 																				
34 1998] 25 EHRR CD 159. 
35 [1998] AC 806, 825. 
36 [2002] 1 FLR 196 [31]. 
37 Choudhry and Fenwick (n 1) 457-458. 
38 ibid. 
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has practical implications for the way the two courts approach family law cases. Thus, as Choudhry 
and Fenwick explained, ‘in the family law sphere the approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights differs considerably from that of the UK courts since it seeks to balance opposing rights and 
does not start from the assumption that the paramountcy principle will determine the issue’.39 It is 
only on the ECtHR’s approach that one can directly weigh parental rights with the welfare of the 
child in making decisions bearing on the parents-child relationship.  
4. The Rights Between the Parties 
As established earlier, the State is obliged to ensure that the individual is not discriminated against as 
a result of his or her disability (‘State-Parents Obligation’). In the particular context at hand, it is the 
State’s duty to ensure that a disabled parent is not placed in a disadvantageous position by virtue of his 
or her disability when considering his or her right to family life. The State-Parent Obligation must be 
distinguished from the rights and duties between a parent and his or her child under the Best 
Interests Test (‘Parents-Child Obligation’). The latter obligation should not be affected by third party 
interests outside the bilateral relationship between parents and their child. Returning to our earlier 
example in the article, it does not matter how much better a third party potential fosterer may be at 
parenting as compared with the child’s parents. As long as the child is adequately cared for, it would 
not generally be acceptable to remove him from his parents.  
The approach to decisions bearing on parents-child relationships adopted by the ECtHR is 
preferable to the welfare principle adopted in the domestic courts because it better reflects the 
parents-child relationship and gives us a better understanding of its nature. This in turn enables us to 
better distinguish the Parents-Child Obligation from the State-Parents Obligation. When looking at 
a complex bundle of obligations, one should begin by attempting to understand the nature of the 
relationships between the parties involved, as this will help identify the nature of the various 
obligations. On the ECtHR’s approach, one recognises the existence of parental rights. Where these 
rights are incompatible with the rights of the child, we can weigh them against each other to 
determine the correct balance to be struck between these two rights. Where one or more parents have 
disabilities, it is clear on this model that it is not a consideration that affects the Parents-Child 
Obligation, because parents with disabilities owe their children exactly the same obligation as able-
bodied parents. The State-Parent Obligation of the State to ensure that parents with disabilities are 
not at an unfair disadvantage due to their disability is external to this Parents-Child Obligation since 
there is no direct obligation between the child and the State in these two obligations.  
In contrast, on the welfare principle, any interests that parents might have are merely 
considered as part of an assessment as to what would be the course of action to maximise the welfare 
of the child. It is unclear whether and, if so, how the State ought to intervene to ensure that parents 
with disabilities are not discriminated against in court proceedings and decisions which would 
potentially bear on their relationship with their children. Without being able to clearly map out the 
various obligations, there is a danger of a child being asked to shoulder some of the burden of a State-
Parent Obligation, to which he or she was never supposed to be party to in the first place.  
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5. Legal Solutions 
The following section explores various legal solutions to eliminate discrimination against parents with 
disabilities in the contexts of care orders and child arrangements orders. To recapitulate the point, it is 
in the nature of the State-Parents Obligation that these solutions have to focus on supporting the 
disabled parent, and not the content of the Parents- Child Obligation within the Best Interests Test.  
A. Alternative Conceptions of the ‘Best Interests Test’ 
 
The foregoing analysis has suggested that parents with disabilities are expected to meet the requisite 
standard of care for their children to the same extent as their able-bodied counterparts. At the very 
least, a child should not have to compromise his or her interests beyond a minimum threshold merely 
because one or both of his or her parents have a disability. However, there are more nuanced 
conceptions of the ‘Best Interests Test’ that satisfies this requirement. 
Eekelaar, for one, has proposed the ‘modified least detrimental alternative’ approach to balance 
the interests of the parent and the child.40 He argues that the virtue of the welfare principle resides in 
the fact that ‘it requires a decision made with respect to a child to be justified from the point of view 
of the child’s interests’, but makes the basic premise that ‘[a] decision need not be justified only from 
that point of view’41 as long as the different interests at stake are clearly delineated and distinguished. 
There are several prongs to the approach: (a) the best course of action is that which avoids inflicting 
the most damage on the well-being of any interested individual, that is, his or her prospects of 
realizing significant life goals;42 (b) it is easier to register a detriment to a child because of their general 
vulnerability and the potential longer-term effects on them; (c) no solution should be adopted where 
the detriments outweigh the benefits for the child, unless that would be the inevitable outcome 
regardless of the course of action taken;43 and (d) there is a degree of detriment to which a child 
should never be subjected.44  
It is interesting to note that the modified least detrimental alternative analysis can produce a 
radically different outcome in favour of a disabled parent. Eekelaar provides the following illustration. 
Suppose a parent (X), who suffers from a disability, seeks to keep the child (C) after separating from 
the other parent (Y). The loss of C would be more detrimental to X than to Y because of the 
assistance C can provide X. However, to remain with X would be a greater loss to C because of 
reduced opportunities and other restrictions arising from the need to help X. On an application of the 
welfare principle, C will go to Y because he or she will enjoy greater welfare with that parent. In 
contrast, on the modified least detrimental alternative analysis, C will prima facie go to X, unless that 
solution would cause an overall detriment to C.  
Another alternative approach to balancing the interests of the parent and the child is Choudhry 
and Fenwick’s ‘parallel analysis’, which is grounded in the ECHR.45 One facet of this analysis is that, 
unlike the welfare principle, the best interests of the child do not prevail automatically. Rather, there 
must be a detailed consideration of all the parties’ rights and interests on a presumptively equal 
footing.46 The Article 8(1) rights of each interested individual to respect for his or her family life must 
be considered in accordance with the requirements outlined in Article 8(2). The individuals’ rights 
will subsequently be weighed against one another in a final balancing exercise, in which the child’s 
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welfare is privileged but not automatically decisive. In this way the parallel analysis harmonises with 
the reasoning process and predicted outcomes on Eekelaar’s approach.47  
While both the modified least detrimental alternative analysis and the parallel analysis are 
preferable to the welfare principle, we recommend the latter approach over the former. The first axis 
of comparison is relative ease of application. While the modified least detrimental alternative analysis 
sets out to be a nuanced approach to the parent-child dynamics, the fact that it is multi-pronged and 
involves ambiguous concepts such as ‘significant life goals’ may pose insuperable difficulties when it 
comes to application to actual proceedings in all their complexity. The second axis of comparison is in 
terms of overall coherence in the law. Given that the parallel analysis, but not the modified least 
detrimental alternative analysis, is modelled on the approach under the ECHR, it better harmonizes 
with the overall law. 
B. Procedural Safeguards in Court Proceedings 
Apart from ensuring that parents with disabilities are not indirectly discriminated against under the 
welfare principle, it is also important to ensure that there are sufficient procedural safeguards for 
parents with disabilities in the relevant court proceedings. For example, in RP v UK48 the ECtHR 
held that, having regard to the Article 6 right to a fair trial enshrined in the ECHR, a person must be 
appointed to represent the best interests of a parent with learning disabilities in court proceedings. 
I. Checklist 
Pursuant to section 7 of the CA 1989, a court considering any question with respect to a child under 
the Act may solicit independent evidence on matters relating to the welfare of that child and may ask 
an appointed social worker, a family court adviser, or such other person as is appropriate to prepare a 
welfare report. Further, before an application for a care order is made, a local authority has a prior 
duty under section 47 of the CA 1989 to investigate cases that give them reasonable cause to suspect 
that a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer significant harm. Alternatively, a local authority may have 
an obligation to investigate cases when directed by a court to do so under section 37 of the 1989 Act. 
While there is broad policy guidance on how welfare assessments and investigations are to be 
conducted,49 and due credit must be given to social workers and other appointed persons as regards 
their practical experience in carrying out these assessments and investigations, such guidance may be 
inadequate in eliminating discrimination against parents with disabilities. First, the judgment calls 
these personnel will have to make can be especially complex in cases involving disabled parent(s). For 
example, a social worker may not fully understand how a disability impairs a parent’s ability to care for 
the child, or she or he may lack the ability to perceive that the parent can provide a different but still 
adequate level of care for the child. 50  Secondly, the risk of inadvertent discrimination against a 
disabled parent is especially palpable when these personnel become risk-averse following social 
outrage over the workings of the child protection system in the aftermath of tragic incidents such as 
the Climbié51 and Baby P52 cases.  
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It is suggested that the welfare assessments and investigations will be more thorough, 
efficacious, and fair if there were a checklist to structure the assessment. Subject to further studies in 
this direction, such a checklist could be placed on a statutory basis so as to empower the courts to 
monitor the manner in which the assessments are conducted. The degree to which a social worker 
adheres to the items on the checklist may also be relevant to the degree of deference given by the 
court to his or her assessment, though the courts should refrain from taking a formalistic approach to 
the application of such a statutory checklist. The weightage given by the social worker to each of the 
elements on the checklist may similarly be subject to review. 
II. Duty to Give Reasons 
In addition, local authorities should have a legal duty to give reasons in making applications for care 
orders. As Lord Mustill noted in the seminal case of R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p Doody, the lack of a general duty to give reasons for an administration decision 
need not detain us since ‘it is equally beyond question that such a duty may in appropriate 
circumstances be implied’.53 The imposition of a duty to give reasons would promote transparency in 
the child protection system and could potentially reveal subconscious discrimination against parents 
with disabilities on judicial review. In order not to impose too onerous an administrative burden on 
the local authorities, the reasons need be no more than a concise account of the way in which they 
have arrived at their decisions. 
6. Social Solutions 
The legal solutions proposed above would better combat direct and indirect discrimination against 
parents with disabilities if they were supplemented with social solutions.  
A. Adequate Support Structures 
The need for the State to render adequate social support to parents with disabilities in meeting their 
child-rearing responsibilities cannot be overstated. Article 23(2) of the CRPD provides that ‘State 
Parties shall render appropriate assistance to persons with disabilities in the performance of their 
child-rearing responsibilities’. Further, the Supreme Court stated in Re B (A Child) (Care 
Proceedings: Threshold Criteria)54 that, if needed, disabled parents should receive the support they 
need to be adequate parents. In the same vein, in Kent County Council v A Mother, Baker J 
acknowledged that ‘people with learning disability may, in many cases, with assistance, be able to 
bring up children successfully’. 55  Financial support, in the form of Independent Living Fund 
Payments, would be a crucial source of support for parents with disabilities but there is definitely 
room for other forms of support. Apart from support from the State, it is arguable that the wider 
community56 ought to contribute to the empowerment of parents with disabilities as well. These 
support structures can play a very significant role in helping parents with disabilities provide the same 
level of care to their children as their non-disabled counterparts.  
B. Partnership 
A fundamental tenet of the CA 1989 is that it seeks to promote a sense of partnership between 
parents and local authorities. Thus, section 17(1)(b) expressly states that it shall be the general duty of 
every local authority ‘so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children 
by their families by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children’s needs’. The 
benefits of a sense of partnership are manifold in relation to parents with disabilities. For example, 
parents are likely to be apprehensive about social workers and their intermittent spot checks, 
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particularly where their disability is psychiatric in nature. A welfare assessment can be conducted in 
the least intrusive manner so that the parents are not unduly stressed. As Herring noted, the ultimate 
aim is that parents having difficulties in parenting will perceive the local authority as a reassuring 
source of support and assistance rather than as a body to be feared.57 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to address an important but often overlooked question: how should the law 
balance the best interests of children with the obligation of the State to eliminate discrimination 
against persons with disabilities? It has set out the current approach taken by the courts as embodied 
by the welfare principle, and has concurred in the conclusion that parents with disabilities should be 
expected to provide the minimum level of care to their children as their able-bodied counterparts. 
However, the article has also considered alternative ways to balancing the interests of the parent and 
the child that could render parents with disabilities less susceptible to losing care or custody of their 
children. Further, it has proposed other legal solutions to combating direct and indirect 
discrimination against parents with disabilities, including procedural safeguards, a statutory checklist, 
and the imposition of a legal duty on local authorities to give reasons for making an application for a 
care order. Last but not least, the article has emphasized the importance of social solutions in this 
regard, such as adequate support structures provided by the State and the wider community, as well as 
bolstering the partnership approach between local authorities and parents. It is the hope of the 
authors that more can be done to protect the interests of parents with disabilities in keeping their 
families together. 
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